| ID | 134586 |
| Title Proper | How U.S. intelligence got Iran wrong |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Porter, Gareth |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The 2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a major intelligence failure, distorted by a pervasive policy climate that assumed that Iraq did indeed have active WMD programs, including nuclear weapons. What has remained unknown, however, is that intelligence assessments on Iran's nuclear program displayed the same systemic distortions that led to the Iraq WMD fiasco. As was the case in the errant Iraq estimate of 2003, two NIEs — in 2001 and 2005 — effectively reversed the burden of proof and reached the conclusion that Iran had been carrying out a covert nuclear weapons program in the absence of hard, verifiable evidence. |
| `In' analytical Note | Middle East Policy Vol.21, No.3; Fal.2014: p.95-103 |
| Journal Source | Middle East Policy Vol: 21 No 3 |
| Standard Number | United States – US |