| ID | 135229 |
| Title Proper | Trading coups for civil war |
| Other Title Information | strategic logic of tolerating rebellion |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Powell, Jonathan M |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While ‘coup-proofing’ practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of ‘coup-proofing’ counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to – or can even potentially benefit from – the existence of an insurgency. |
| `In' analytical Note | African Security Review Vol.23, No.4; Nov.2014: p.329-338 |
| Journal Source | African Security Review Vol: 23 No 4 |
| Key Words | Security ; Insurgency ; Military Effectiveness ; Civil Conflict ; Political Survival ; Military Coups ; Coup-Proofing ; Civil War |