| ID | 135825 |
| Title Proper | Deterring ‘able archer’ |
| Other Title Information | comments arising from Adamsky’s ‘lessons for deterrence theory and practice’ |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Milevski, Lukas |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This is a short commentary on Dmitry Adamsky’s recent article ‘The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice’. First, it teases out nuances in the relationship between deterrence and strategy and considers deterrence to be both a strategy and an effect. Second, it explores the culminating point of deterrence in theory and considers it untenable, as it does not conform to the logic of, or to any logic analogous to, Clausewitz’s culminating point of victory. Deterrence logically cannot culminate. Moreover, any culminating point of deterrence would ignore why the potential deteree should perceive the actions of his deterrer in such a way as to render strengthened strategies of deterrence counterproductive. It is the deteree who is the only strategic actor to determine whether the deterrer is actually practising a successful strategy of deterrence or not. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol.37, No.6-7; Dec.2014: p.1050-1065 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 37 No 6-7 |
| Standard Number | Strategy |