ID | 135967 |
Title Proper | China and Taiwan |
Other Title Information | balance of rivalry with weapons of mass democratization |
Language | ENG |
Author | Scobell, Andrew |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | RAISE THE SUBJECT OF TAIWAN WITH ANYONE from the People's Republic of China (PRC)—whether the person is a government official or an ordinary citizen—and you will probably get a vehement and passionate articulation of China's sovereign claim to the island. But Taiwan is not just an emotional hot-button issue in China; rather, it is considered the PRC's most sensitive security issue.
Indeed, Beijing views Taipei as a major rival, or at least as posing a serious security threat. Certainly there are other political entities that China sees as rivals—the United States and Japan come swiftly to mind. It is easy to understand at a glance why Beijing would perceive Washington and Tokyo as rivals—in terms of the magnitude of the economic and military clout of each, as well as the geographic and demographic size of the United States and Japan. In contrast, to the casual observer, Taiwan would not seem likely to be perceived by China as a rival. The balance of power across the Taiwan Strait is extremely lopsided in favor of China. While the island is an economic dynamo and global trading power of considerable significance and possesses a credible defense capability, all these are dwarfed by the gargantuan capabilities of its cross-strait neighbor. Given this glaring asymmetry in the balance of power between China and Taiwan, why would Beijing characterize its relationship with Taipei as a rivalry? |
`In' analytical Note | Political Science Quarterly Vol.129, No.3; Fal.2014: p.449-468 |
Journal Source | Political Science Quarterly Vol: 129 No 3 |
Standard Number | United States – US |