| ID | 136711 |
| Title Proper | Balance of Incentives |
| Other Title Information | why North Korea Interacts with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Habib, Benjamin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This study is concerned with motivations driving North Korea’s interaction with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, drawing on information from treaty reporting documents, along with project reports compiled by international agencies and official statements released by the North Korean government. The article draws on causal inference to explore the hypothesis that the leadership perpetuation and state survival imperatives of the North Korean government represent the most likely explanation for North Korea’s interaction with the international climate change regime. It finds a strong probability that North Korea is utilising the UNFCCC as a capacity-building vehicle across its agricultural and energy sectors, a weak issue_images_88_1_Hydroelectric dam at Sinpyong (July 2012)_Habibpossibility that North Korea’s climate change vulnerability is a compelling incentive for greenhouse gas mitigation, and the weak possibility that North Korea is using the Clean Development Mechanism under the UNFCCC as a means for generating foreign currency revenue. The paper argues that the balance of incentives underpinning these motivations can be linked to the leadership perpetuation and state survival imperatives of the North Korean government. |
| `In' analytical Note | Pacific Affairs Vol.88, No.1; Mar.2015: p.75-97 |
| Journal Source | Pacific Affairs Vol: 88 No 1 |
| Key Words | Environment ; North Korea ; Climate Change ; Vulnerability ; Greenhouse Gas Mitigation ; Energy Insecurity ; UNFCCC ; Clean Development Mechanism ; Food Insecurity ; UN Framework Convention |