| ID | 136879 |
| Title Proper | Pakistan's nuclear first-use doctrine |
| Other Title Information | obsessions and obstacles |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Khan, Zafar |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | A close look at the literature on Pakistan's nuclear weapons doctrine reveals the ambiguity in Pakistan's nuclear-use options. Pakistani officials and commentators leave open the possibility that Pakistan would use its nuclear weapon first, but it is not clear when, where, or how it would. Others conclude that Islamabad would use its nuclear weapon only as a last resort, but that condition too remains vague. This article examines the puzzle of Pakistan's nuclear weapons use, demonstrating that ambiguity plays a central role in Pakistan's nuclear weapons policy, much as nuclear ambiguity exists in each nuclear weapons state's policy. This article departs from previous research and commentary on Pakistan's nuclear doctrine by introducing the thesis that Pakistan's nuclear ambiguity is real, but far from internationally unique. Pakistan, like the USA at the onset of the nuclear era, relies on nuclear weapons for survival. The development of Pakistan's forces, including tactical nuclear weapons, suggests an emphasis on counterforce targeting. The role of domestic political processes, the civil–military dilemma and its impact on strategic policy in Pakistan, have received considerable attention, but still require untangling. Progress towards no first use probably requires changes to the conventional balance in South Asia, and stronger democratic, civilian rule in Pakistan, free of direct intervention from the army. Finally, global dynamics shaping the salience of nuclear weapons globally cannot be disregarded in any assessment of South Asian and Pakistani dynamics. |
| `In' analytical Note | Contemporary Security Policy Vol.36, No.1; Apr.2015: p.149-170 |
| Journal Source | Contemporary Security Policy Vol: 33 No 2 |
| Standard Number | Pakistan |