| ID | 137153 |
| Title Proper | Counterterrorism as war |
| Other Title Information | identifying the dangers, risks, and opportunity costs of U.S. strategy toward Al Qaeda and its affiliates |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | McIntosh, Christopher |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The U.S. war on Al Qaeda is well into its second decade—why has this particular conflict been so difficult to end? This article argues it is not due to the strategic acumen of Al Qaeda, but because of the problems intrinsic to relying on war as the framework for U.S. counterterrorism policy. The normal means of ending wars are complicated with a terrorist enemy and at odds with strategies that have historically had success at the end stages of counterterror campaigns. Continuing along the current path risks an ongoing war the United States will likely neither win nor fully end. |
| `In' analytical Note | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 38, No.1; Jan 2015: p.23-38 |
| Journal Source | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol: 38 No 1 |
| Key Words | United States ; Al Qaeda ; Counterterrorism Policy |