| ID | 137206 |
| Title Proper | Petition and repression in China's authoritarian regime |
| Other Title Information | evidence from a natural experiment |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Wong, Stan Hok-wui ; Peng, Minggang |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | China has established a petition system to elicit information about grievances. However, the petition system may have perverse effects because it also reveals to the center the failure of local-level officials to resolve those grievances. Anecdotal accounts suggest that local officials have incentive to silence petitioners, often with the use of repression. In this article we study whether non–regime threatening petitions would provoke local governments' coercive response. To tackle the endogenous relationship between petition and repression, we take advantage of a natural experiment afforded by a change in hydroelectricity policy in China. In particular, we use provincial hydropower outputs as an instrument to identify citizen petitions. We find that citizen petitions significantly increase a province's spending on its repressive apparatus. The results suggest a paradoxical outcome of China's petition system: while it may help reduce the national authority's use of repression, it has caused an explosion of repression within the authoritarian system as a whole. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol.15, No.1; Jan-Mar.2015: p.27-68 |
| Journal Source | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol: 15 No 1 |
| Standard Number | Chinese Politics |
| Key Words | Energy System ; Political Repression ; Chinese Politics ; Contentious Politics ; Authoritarian Politics ; Authoritarian Regime ; Petition System ; Petitions ; Elicit System ; China's Authoritarian Regime |