| ID | 137246 |
| Title Proper | Rethinking stability in South Asia |
| Other Title Information | India, Pakistan, and the competition for escalation dominance |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Montgomery, Evan Braden ; Edelman, Eric S |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a competition for escalation dominance. While New Delhi is preparing for a limited conventional campaign against Pakistan, Islamabad is pursuing limited nuclear options to deter India. Together, these trends could increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict. India, for example, might conclude that it can launch an invasion without provoking a nuclear reprisal, while Pakistan might believe that it can employ nuclear weapons without triggering a nuclear exchange. Even if war can be avoided, these trends could eventually compel India to develop its own limited nuclear options in an effort to enhance deterrence and gain coercive leverage over Pakistan. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 38, No.1-2; Feb 2015: p.159-182 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic StudiesVol: 38 No 1-2 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; Deterrence ; India ; Escalation ; Pakistan - 1967-1977 |