| ID | 137279 |
| Title Proper | Conditional deterrence and missile defense |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gibilterra, John |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The traditional view of ballistic missile defense is that defensive weapons are destabilizing. This article explains why the more broadly and traditionally accepted classical approach to deterrence is flawed and demonstrates the greater explanatory power and implications of conditional deterrence based on power parity theory. Given the implications that can be drawn from conditional deterrence, this article demonstrates that limited efforts at developing and deploying missile defenses enhance deterrence and reduce the ballistic missile threat in the short term and may also discourage the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol. 34, No.1; Jan-Mar 2015: p.64-73 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol: 34 No 1 |
| Key Words | Missile Defense ; Ballistic Missile Defense ; Conditional Deterrence ; Weapons of Mass Destruction |