| ID | 137954 |
| Title Proper | Explaining governance of the judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe |
| Other Title Information | external incentives, transnational elites and parliamentary inaction |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Parau, Cristina E |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What made democratic politicians in Central and Eastern Europe exclude themselves from governance of the judiciary? Institutional change in the judiciary is investigated through a diachronic study of the Romanian judiciary which reveals a complex causal nexus. The classical model of the ‘external incentives’ of EU accession, while explaining a general drive toward revision, played an otherwise marginal role. An institutional template prevailed, promoted by an elite transnational community of legal professionals whose entrepreneurs steering the revision of governance of the judiciary after 1989. The parliamentarians, disempowered by this revision, offered no resistance—a ‘veto-player dormancy’ that stands revealed as preconditional to such transnational influences. |
| `In' analytical Note | Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 67, No.3; May 2015: p.409-442 |
| Journal Source | Europe-Asia Studies Vol: 67 No 3 |
| Key Words | Central Europe ; Eastern Europe ; Governance ; Judiciary ; Transnational Community ; Transnational Elites ; Parliamentary Inaction ; Democratic Politicians ; Veto - Player Dormancy |