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ID138170
Title ProperAlliance coercion and nuclear restraint
Other Title Informationhow the United States thwarted West Germany's nuclear ambitions
LanguageENG
AuthorGerzhoy, Gene
Summary / Abstract (Note)A prominent model of nuclear proliferation posits that a powerful patron state can prevent a weaker ally from proliferating by providing it with security guarantees. The history of West Germany's pursuit of the bomb from 1954 to 1969 suggests that a patron may also need to threaten the client state with military abandonment to convince it not to acquire nuclear weapons.
`In' analytical NoteInternational Security Vol. 39, No.4; Spring 2015: p.91-129
Journal SourceInternational Security Vol: 39 No 4
Key WordsNuclear Proliferation ;  United States ;  Nuclear Restraint ;  Coercion ;  West Germany ;  Nuclear Ambitions ;  Military Abandonment


 
 
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