| ID | 138443 |
| Title Proper | Demythologising Dhofar |
| Other Title Information | British policy, military strategy, and counter-insurgency in Oman, 1963–1976 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hughes, Geraint |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article re-examines the civil war (1963–1976) between the Sultanate of Oman and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), particularly the U.K.’s support of the government. Using archival evidence and private papers, it argues that the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign’s image as “population-centric” is flawed, and that the British and Omani governments relied more on military measures against the PFLO to recapture Dhofar province than on the “hearts and minds” and civil development programmes emphasised in traditional accounts. It counsels against using Dhofar as a possible example of indirect military assistance in contemporary COIN, arguing that the conflict’s specific historical characteristics may not be replicated now or in the immediate future. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Military History Vol. 79, No.2; Apr 2015: p.423-456 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Military History 2015-04 79, 2 |
| Key Words | Military Strategy ; Oman ; British Policy ; Counter - Insurgency ; Civil War ; Demythologising Dhofar ; PFLO ; Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman ; Sultanate of Oman ; Dhofar Province |