| ID | 138792 |
| Title Proper | Cyber house rules |
| Other Title Information | on war, retaliation and escalation |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gompert, David C ; Libicki, Martin ; Cavaiola, Lawrence J |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | When it comes to cyber war, the United States is ambivalent. While persuaded of the utility of offensive cyber operations, it dreads where they might lead. The advantages of cyber war are swamped by the disadvantages if it cannot be kept under control – and there are nagging doubts about whether it can. That computer systems are often interconnected and ultipurpose,
and that there are no sharp ‘firebreaks’ in cyber war, compounds the dangers of escalation to unintended levels and effects, including the disruption of critical civilian services. In a crisis or war, the United States might, despite misgivings, feel compelled to attack computer systems that enable the enemy to strike US forces, only to find itself engaged in cycles of attack and retaliation that produce more pain than gain. |
| `In' analytical Note | Survival : the IISS Quarterly Vol. 57, No.1; Feb/Mar 2015: p.81–104 |
| Journal Source | Surviva Vol: 57 No 1 |
| Key Words | Cyberspace ; Cyber War ; Cyber Attacks ; C4ISR ; Cyber House Rules ; On War ; Retaliation and Escalation ; Offensive Cyber Operations ; Critical Civilian Services ; US Cyber Attacks ; Military Computer Systems |