| ID | 138852 |
| Title Proper | Rhetoric of appeasement |
| Other Title Information | Hitler's legitimation and British foreign policy, 1938–39 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Goddard, Stacie E |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain’s decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany’s legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany’s aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 24, No.1; Jan/Mar 2015: p.95-130 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 24 No 1 |
| Key Words | International System ; Strategic Balance ; Rhetoric ; Nazi Germany ; British Foreign Policy ; British Grand Strategy ; Rhetoric of Appeasement ; Hitler’s Legitimation ; 1938–39 ; Legitimation Strategies ; Rational Uncertainty |