| ID | 138892 |
| Title Proper | Semi-proxy wars and U.S. counterterrorism strategy |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Cragin, R Kim |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda's organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL's behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. |
| `In' analytical Note | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 38, No.5; May 2015: p.311-327 |
| Journal Source | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol: 38 No 5 |
| Key Words | Counterterrorism ; United States ; Syria ; Lebanon ; Al Qaeda ; Hezbollah ; Counterterrorism Strategy ; ISIL ; Semi - Proxy Wars ; Syria's Semi - Proxy War ; Abhat al-Nusra |