| ID | 139501 |
| Title Proper | Rational limitations of a nonconventional deterrence regime |
| Other Title Information | the Iranian case |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Guzansky, Yoel ; Golov, Avner |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The question of how to measure a state's rationality and compatibility with deterrence must be confronted in order to address the broader theoretical discussion concerning the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence. This article broadens Janice Stein's three-condition model of potential constraints of deterrence as a theory and a strategy. It then applies this revised model as a means of identifying potential obstacles to a future nonconventional deterrence regime with Iran, concluding with an assessment as to whether this analysis can support the argument that such a future deterrence regime would be stable. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol. 34, No.2; Apr/Jun 2015: p.169-184 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol: 34 No 2 |
| Key Words | Iran ; Internal Factors ; Rational Limitations ; Nonconventional Deterrence Regime ; Future Deterrence Regime ; Assessing Iran's Rationality |