| ID | 139579 |
| Title Proper | When states appease |
| Other Title Information | British appeasement in the 1930s |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Harris, Peter ; Trubowitz, Peter |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | When do states appease their foes? In this article, we argue that governments are most likely to favour appeasing a foreign threat when their top leaders are severely cross–pressured: when the demands for increased security conflict sharply with their domestic political priorities. We develop the deductive argument through a detailed analysis of British appeasement in the 1930s. We show that Neville Chamberlain grappled with a classic dilemma of statecraft: how to reduce the risk of German expansionism while facing acute partisan and electoral incentives to invest resources at home. For Chamberlain, appeasement was a means to reconcile the demands for increased security with what he and his co-partisans were trying to achieve domestically. We conclude by discussing implications of the analysis for theorising about appeasement and about how leaders make grand strategy more generally. |
| `In' analytical Note | Review of International Studies Vol. 41, No.2; Apr 2015: p.289-312 |
| Journal Source | Review of International Studies Vol: 41 No 2 |
| Key Words | Grand Strategy ; States Appease ; British Appeasement ; 1930 ; German Expansionism |