| ID | 139794 |
| Title Proper | Do finite duration provisions reduce international bargaining delay? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bearce, David H ; Eldredge, Cody D ; Jolliff, Brandy J |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This research note hypothesizes that international agreements including a finite duration provision or with a shorter expected duration should take less time to negotiate. Using a random sample of agreements across different issue areas, it finds statistical support for this hypothesis. Agreements without a finite duration provision experienced a bargaining phase that was twice as long as agreements including a finite duration provision and otherwise short-term agreements. This result not only offers empirical support for the theoretical proposition that a longer shadow of the future leads to increased bargaining delay—it also has important policy implications. International negotiators can include a finite duration provision when they prefer a shorter bargaining phase to a potentially more durable agreement, and they can avoid this feature when they prefer a more durable agreement, although this decision comes with the cost of additional bargaining delay. By treating finite duration provisions as an independent variable, this result also addresses a critique of the research program on the rational design of international institutions that it moves backward by considering only design features as dependent variables. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Organization Vol. 69, No.1; Winter 2015: p.219-239 |
| Journal Source | International Organization Vol: 69 No 1 |
| Key Words | International Agreements ; Finite Duratio ; Provisions Reduce ; International Bargaining Delay ; International Negotiators ; Durable Agreement |