| ID | 139842 |
| Title Proper | Social structure of the market for force |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Petersohn, Ulrich |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) to support military operations in conflicts. However, many observers have argued that such companies are ‘greedy market actors’ or ‘reckless mercenaries’ and their level of performance very poor. A minority has defended them as security professionals. If market competition is present, the level of performance is high and positive contributions to the client’s military operation can be expected. However, neither PMSC opponents nor proponents can account for the variance in the level of performance in three crucial cases – Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This article argues that different market structures explain this variance. At least three ideal configurations exist: collaborative, competitive, and rival structures. These structures influence the level of performance. PMSC performance levels are expected to decrease from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative. |
| `In' analytical Note | Cooperation and Conflict Vol. 50, No.2; Jun 2015: p.269-285 |
| Journal Source | Cooperation and Conflict 2015-06 50, 2 |
| Key Words | Private Security ; Outsourcing ; Contracting ; Markets for Force |