| ID | 139849 |
| Title Proper | Selective enforcement of land regulations |
| Other Title Information | why large-scale violators succeed |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Sun, Xin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Despite the government’s decades-long enforcement efforts, violations of land laws and regulations remain a serious problem in China. Local governments have often been blamed. This article identifies a previously overlooked reason for large-scale violations, by examining the enforcement behavior of the central government. It argues that the government enforces land regulations selectively, depending on the violators’ political status. The article focuses on the national policy prohibiting new golf course construction, finding that golf course developers connected with high-level political élites are more likely to violate the prohibition and survive subsequent enforcement actions by the central government. This finding contributes to the literature on regulatory enforcement in authoritarian regimes and has broad implications for reforms in China. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Journal Vol. , 74; Jul 2015: p.66-90 |
| Journal Source | China Journal No 74 |
| Key Words | China ; Local governments ; National Policy ; Authoritarian Regimes ; Selective Enforcement ; Land Regulations ; Large - Scale Violators ; Long Enforcement Efforts ; Regulatory Enforcement |