| ID | 140260 |
| Title Proper | Performance measurement in military operations |
| Other Title Information | information versus incentives |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Blanken, Leo J ; Lepore, Jason J |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We explore the impact of strategic assessment efforts on military organizations at war. To do so, we construct a model to explore the impact of a principal’s choice among imperfect performance metrics for a military operation. In doing so, the principal must consider both the incentivizing and informational properties of the metric. We show the conditions under which uncertainty regarding the nature of the agent, as well as uncertainty regarding the operational environment, drives a metric choice that induces pathological behavior from the agent. More specifically, a poor metric choice can create an overly optimistic assessment and end up prolonging the conflict. We illustrate the model’s insights in the cases of World War II and the Vietnam War. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 26, No.5; Oct 2015: p.516-535 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 26 No 5 |
| Key Words | Military Strategy ; Principal - Agent ; Measures of Performance ; Measures of Effectiveness ; Wartime Assessment |