| ID | 141128 |
| Title Proper | Strategic logic of nuclear restraint |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Mount, Adam |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | It is manifestly in the American interest that nuclear weapons are never again used in war – but if they are, should the United States retaliate in kind? In many ways, US nuclear policy still labours in the shadow of Cold War deterrence models, yet a new concept of nuclear escalation is coming to dominate strategic planning. Today, there is little risk of a massive, disarming strike of the sort that kept Cold War presidents awake in the night. Instead, strategists worry that a regional adversary could use a nuclear weapon in an attempt to offset US conventional superiority and truncate an escalating conflict on favourable terms. This concept of nuclear use, referred to here as ‘offset escalation’, not only makes it more difficult to manage crises with regional nuclear powers, but also changes how strategists should think about what to do if deterrence fails. |
| `In' analytical Note | Survival : the IISS Quarterly Vol. 57, No.4; Aug/Sep 2015: p.53-76 |
| Journal Source | Survival Vol: 57 No 4 |
| Key Words | Nuclear ; United States ; Arms Control & Disarmament ; Nuclear Wapon |