| ID | 141150 |
| Title Proper | Military maladaptation |
| Other Title Information | counterinsurgency and the politics of failure |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Harkness, Kristen A ; Hunzeker, Michael |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 38, No.6; Oct 2015: p.777-800 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 38 No 6 |
| Key Words | Tactics ; Counterinsurgency ; organizational change ; British Army ; Clausewitz ; Military Adaptation ; Wartime Learning ; Post - Colonial Africa |