| ID | 141168 |
| Title Proper | Myth of coup-proofing |
| Other Title Information | risk and instances of military coups d’état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950–2013 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Albrecht, Holger |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article argues that coup-proofing does not necessarily reduce the general propensity among military officers to stage coups d’état against authoritarian incumbents. Sophisticated coup-proofing terminates coup cascades and buys incumbent rulers time in office, but general coup risk remains high even if they maintain power for long periods of time. The article uses a new data set on coups in the Middle East and North Africa covering the period 1950–2013. The data reveal that the number of coup instances has decreased over time, but the risk for incumbents of falling to a coup during their extended time in office remains constant, even in coup-proofed autocracies. When autocrats apply coup-proofing measures, timing and agency become increasingly important. Plotters attempt coups either immediately after power turnovers or when incumbents turn into lame ducks after excessively long periods of rule. Success rates increase when coup plotters are supported by central military leaderships. |
| `In' analytical Note | Armed Forces and Society Vol. 41, No.4; Oct 2015: p.659-687 |
| Journal Source | Armed Forces and Society Vol: 41 No 4 |
| Key Words | Middle East and North Africa ; Authoritarian Regimes ; Coup-Proofing ; Coups D’État |