| ID | 141294 |
| Title Proper | Perils of weak organization |
| Other Title Information | explaining loyalty and defection of militant organizations toward Pakistan |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Popovic, Milos |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why do some militant groups defect against their sponsors, while others remain loyal? Pakistan's sponsorship of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba offers a controlled case comparison as the former turned its guns against Islamabad, while the latter remained obedient despite a similar strength, ethnic ties to the regime, and the presence of alternative supporters. What explains Jaish's defection and Lashkar's loyalty? Drawing on organizational and principal-agent theory, I argue that militant organizations that are more decentralized and factionalized are more likely to turn on their sponsors, because their weak command and control as well as dispersed decision making limit the militant leaders' ability to follow through on their commitments to the sponsors and makes it more difficult for the sponsors to discipline the militant organization. When a sponsor attempts to coerce such organizations into submission by detaining militant leaders, freezing or confiscating their material assets the rank-and-file is likely to turn guns against the sponsor. |
| `In' analytical Note | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 38, No.11; Nov 2015: p.919-937 |
| Journal Source | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol: 38 No 11 |
| Key Words | Pakistan ; Loyalty ; Weak Organization ; Defection ; Perils ; Militant Organizations |