| ID | 141546 |
| Title Proper | How to prevent an Iranian bomb |
| Other Title Information | the case for deterrence |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Mandelbaum, Michael |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reached by Iran, six other countries, and the European Union in Vienna in July, has sparked a heated political debate in the United States. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran has agreed to accept some temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program. The Obama administration, a chief negotiator of the accord, argues that the deal will freeze and in some ways set back Iran’s march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic, which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the international inspection of Iran’s nuclear facilities that will discourage and, if necessary, detect any Iranian cheating, triggering stiff penalties in response. |
| `In' analytical Note | Foreign Affairs Vol. 94, No.6; Nov/Dec 2015:p.19-24 |
| Journal Source | Foreign Affairs Vol: 94 No 6 |
| Key Words | Deterrence ; Economic Sanctions ; United States ; Korean Peninsula ; Hezbollah ; Iranian Bomb ; Credible Threat ; Soviet Union ; The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ; JCPOA ; 1979 Iranian Revolution ; North Korean Bomb ; Iranian Proliferation |