| ID | 141679 |
| Title Proper | Trident replacement and UK nuclear deterrence |
| Other Title Information | requirements in an uncertain future |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Futter, Andrew |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | A decision to replace Trident with a like-for-like system will see the UK remain in the nuclear-weapons business well into the second half of this century, but it is far from clear that reliance on a small, retaliatory nuclear capability for deterrence would be the best approach to an increasingly complex future nuclear-threat landscape. Andrew Futter argues that the requirements of deterrence are perhaps more blurred today than at any point in the nuclear age – a situation only likely to get worse. A more holistic and long-term view of UK nuclear policy is needed, with greater consideration given to how techno-military, strategic and, to a lesser extent, political-normative developments are likely to alter, if not transform, the nature of the future deterrence environment. |
| `In' analytical Note | Rusi Journal Vol. 160, No.5; Oct/Nov 2015: p.60-67 |
| Journal Source | Rusi Journal Vol: 160 No 5 |
| Key Words | Uncertain Future ; Trident Replacement ; UK Nuclear Deterrence ; Nuclear-Weapons Business |