| ID | 142174 |
| Title Proper | Iran and Daesh |
| Other Title Information | the case of a reluctant Shia power |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Akbarzadeh, Shahram |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | President Hassan Rouhani came to office in 2014 with a popular mandate to relieve Iran's international isolation. His electoral campaign focused on ending the crippling sanctions Iran has suffered due to the ongoing dispute over its nuclear program. Rouhani promised to make “moderation” the centerpiece of his government, but breaking out of isolation has proven to be much more difficult than the reform-inclined Rouhani government expected. The Arab upheaval has morphed into sectarian warfare, championed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“Daesh” in Arabic and Persian). This conflict has presented Iran with a most unwanted problem. From its inception, Iran has projected itself as a champion of the whole Muslim community. It has stayed clear of sectarian disputes with its Sunni neighbors and presented its disagreements with Saudi Arabia, for example, in terms of global Muslim interests. It highlighted the failure of U.S.-friendly Arab leaders to protect the Palestinians as the cardinal charge against them. Their Sunni affiliation was not the issue. However, the bloody sectarian conflict in Iraq and Syria, with spot fires in other states, has forced Iran to engage with the sectarian issue. Events of the past few years have made it impossible for Iran to ignore the schism. This complicates President Rouhani's task: his promised mantra of “prudence and hope” (tadbir va omid) has effectively been sidelined in the context of forming a Daesh policy. Iran is forced into relying on its Shia allies to respond to the threat posed by Daesh, making Iran a reluctant Shia power in the region. |
| `In' analytical Note | Middle East Policy Vol. 22, No.2; Fall 2015: p.44–54 |
| Journal Source | Middle East Policy Vol: 22 No 3 |
| Key Words | Iran ; Daesh ; Reluctant Shia Power |