| ID | 142566 |
| Title Proper | Punishing corrupt officials in China |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Zhu, Lin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | China presents a mixed picture in terms of its anti-corruption efforts. On the one hand, rampant corruption remains a huge challenge for the party-state because it not only results in the loss of state assets but also damages the legitimacy of the regime. On the other hand, China's record of curbing corruption is not particularly worse than other comparable countries. This paper explains the reasons behind this mixed picture by focusing on the anti-corruption strategy employed by the central Party authorities. Effective anti-corruption measures are determined by the high probability of detecting corrupt agents and the meting out of effective and warranted punishment. In China, the central government is unable or unwilling to investigate a large number of officials, especially high-ranking officials. However, at the same time, it must impose severe punishment on convicted high-ranking officials. Although this mode of selective discipline compromises the credibility of the state in terms of anti-corruption efficacy, it also creates uncertainty for corrupt agents because corrupt officials are not guaranteed exemption. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Quarterly , No. 223; Sep 2015: p.595-617 |
| Journal Source | China Quarterly No 223 |
| Key Words | China ; Corruption ; Punishment ; Disciplining ; Officials |