| ID | 142648 |
| Title Proper | Indian military modernization and conventional deterrence in South Asia |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ladwig, Walter C III |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tactical-nuclear weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 38, No.5; Aug 2015: p.729-772 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 38 No 5 |
| Key Words | Conventional deterrence ; India ; Pakistan ; Tactical Nuclear Weapons ; Military Modernization |