| ID | 143011 |
| Title Proper | Nuclear strategies of emerging nuclear powers |
| Other Title Information | North Korea and Iran |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Narang, Vipin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What if nuclear aspirants get the bomb? How likely are they to use it? Which nuclear strategies might emerging nuclear powers adopt? These may seem like academic questions, but they are loaded with strategic significance. Different nuclear strategies have historically been associated with distinct types of risk. Some nuclear strategies are more likely to deter U.S. freedom of action; some more sharply increase the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. The type of nuclear posture or strategy a state is likely to choose, then, ought to affect the price the international community is willing to pay to stop or rollback emerging nuclear powers. These questions merit urgent answers. North Korea is believed to have at least a rudimentary plutonium-based nuclear weapons capability, is presently assessed to have a uranium enrichment capability to expand its fissile material stockpile, and periodically threatens to restart its plutonium production pathway. The international community is intensively trying to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability based on uranium enrichment. Much policy and academic energy has centered on trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. But if these efforts fail, what next? Which nuclear strategy might these states choose? |
| `In' analytical Note | Washington Quarterly Vol. 38, No.1; Spring 2015: p.43-92 |
| Journal Source | Washington Quarterly Vol: 38 No 1 |
| Key Words | Iran ; North Korea ; Nuclear Strategies ; Role of China ; Emerging Nuclear Powers ; North Korea's Nuclear Strategic Choice ; United States and South Korea |