| ID | 143145 |
| Title Proper | Transparency, protest, and autocratic instability |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Rosendorff, B Peter ; Hollyer, James R ; JAMES R. HOLLYER ; Vreeland, Ames Raymond |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The collapse of autocratic regimes is often brought about through large-scale mobilization and collective action by elements of the populace. The willingness of any given member of the public to participate in actions such as strikes and protests is contingent upon her beliefs about others’ willingness to similarly mobilize. In this article, we examine the effect of a specific form of transparency—the disclosure of economic data by the government—on citizen belief formation, and consequently on collective mobilization. We present a theoretical model in which, under autocratic rule, transparency increases the frequency of protests, and increases the extent to which protest is correlated with incumbent performance. We find empirical support for these claims. Transparency destabilizes autocracies via mass protest. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 109, No.4; Nov 2015: p.764-784 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2015-12 109, 4 |
| Key Words | Transparency ; Protest ; Autocratic Regimes ; Autocratic Instability |