| ID | 143300 |
| Title Proper | US advanced conventional systems and conventional prompt global strike ambitions |
| Other Title Information | assessing the risks, benefits, and arms control implications |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gormley, Dennis M |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 22, No.2; Jun 2015: p.123-140 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation ReviewVol: 22 No 2 |
| Key Words | Arms Control ; conventional weapons ; Missiles ; United States ; China ; Russia ; Strategic Stability ; Prompt Global Strike |