| ID | 143304 |
| Title Proper | Canary in the nuclear submarine |
| Other Title Information | assessing the nonproliferation risk of the naval nuclear propulsion loophole |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kaplow, Jeffrey |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows states to exempt nuclear material from international safeguards for use in nuclear submarine programs. This material, however, could be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes without the knowledge of inspectors, creating a potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty. This article argues that exercising that loophole today would amount to admitting a nuclear weapon program, making it a particularly poor pathway to a weapon for a potential proliferant. Still, if states like Brazil ultimately exempt nuclear material from safeguards for a nuclear submarine effort, they could set a dangerous precedent that makes it easier for others to use the loophole as a route to a nuclear weapon capability. There are several policy options available to mitigate the damage of such a precedent; most promising is the prospect of a voluntary safeguards arrangement that would allow international inspectors to keep an eye on nuclear material even after it has been dedicated to a naval nuclear propulsion program. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 22, No.2; Jun 2015: p.185-202 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation ReviewVol: 22 No 2 |
| Key Words | proliferation ; Iran ; Brazil ; India ; Safeguards ; Nuclear submarines ; Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Propulsion |