| ID | 143619 |
| Title Proper | Making war, thinking history |
| Other Title Information | David Ben-Gurion, analogical reasoning and the Suez Crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Saltzman, Ilai Z |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Historical analogies, and historical reasoning, enable policy-makers to overcome major fundamental difficulties in the process of crisis decision-making. By employing lessons and conclusions from past experience, leaders believe they can avoid future failures and make better choices. This paper identifies, for the first time, the key analogies David Ben-Gurion and other key Israeli policy-makers employed prior to the eruption of the Sinai War of October 1956 and their reasoning. It demonstrates that Ben-Gurion was highly sensitive to historical occurrences, personal, national and international, and exhibited great inclination to engage the crisis with Egypt according to the lessons he drew from it. The analogical framework explains the timing of the offensive against Egypt and its distinct nature. |
| `In' analytical Note | Israel Affairs Vol. 22, No.1; Jan 2016: p.45-68 |
| Journal Source | Israel Affairs Vol: 22 No 1 |
| Key Words | David Ben-Gurion ; Suez War ; Foreign Policy ; Historical Analogies |