| ID | 143688 |
| Title Proper | Pakistan’s evolving strategic outlook |
| Other Title Information | strategy and nuclear deterrence |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Khan, Zulfqar |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | It is argued that, Pakistan’s “full spectrum” nuclear strategy is based upon the concept of proportionate calibration against the perceived threat of a limited strike by the conventionally much superior military forces of India. Pakistan’s strategy is emitting robust signaling vis-à-vis the apparent strikes with the objective to deter the adversary from operationalizing its flawed limited war doctrine. Moreover, its strategic nuclear forces would perform the function of a dynamic reserve asset and as an ultimate deterrent against India. Most significantly, it would convince India of consequences in the case of deliberate escalation of a crisis or plan of a limited military operation. In essence, it also sufficiently reflects Pakistan’s preparation and “willingness to fight.” In the absence of a conflict resolution mechanism, diplomatic dialogue, both countries’ nuclear deterrent capabilities are expected to perpetuate the element of uncertainty especially during crises. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 28, No.1; Mar 2016: p.103-121 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 28 No 1 |
| Key Words | Security ; Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Deterrence ; South Asia ; India ; Pakistan ; Escalation ; Strategy ; Battlefield Nuclear Weapons |