| ID | 144331 |
| Title Proper | Northern Ireland and minimum force |
| Other Title Information | the refutation of a concept? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Smith, M L R ; Morgan, B W |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 27, No.1; Feb 2016: p.81-105 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol: 27 No 1 |
| Key Words | Northern Ireland ; British Army ; Minimum Force ; Counter-Insurgency |