| ID | 144447 |
| Title Proper | Does spoiling work? assessing the impact of spoilers on civil war peace agreements |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Reiter, Andrew G |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Scholars and policymakers argue that violent actors – termed ‘spoilers’ – pose a significant threat to civil war peace agreements. Yet existing research, which is overly reliant on single-case studies, has not effectively determined how prevalent spoiling is, or thoroughly examined what its ultimate effects are on peace agreements. This article draws on a newly constructed cross-national dataset of spoiling following 241 civil war peace agreements in the post-Cold War era to analyze spoiling. It finds that spoiling intended to terminate an agreement is not as common as typically assumed, but still plagues a sizeable number of peace agreements. Moreover, most actors who resort to this strategy typically fail in their goals and the agreement is not at risk, despite the high publicity and attention given to these threats. Yet particular types of actors, most notably paramilitaries and state security forces excluded from the agreement, can pose a significant threat to peace. |
| `In' analytical Note | Civil Wars Vol. 17, No.1; Mar 2015: p.89-111 |
| Journal Source | Civil Wars Vol: 17 No 1 |
| Key Words | Peace Agreements ; Civil War ; Violent Actors ; Threat to Peace |