| ID | 144789 |
| Title Proper | Defensive weapons and star wars |
| Other Title Information | a supergame with optimal punishments |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Giacomello, Giampiero ; Lambertini, Luca |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if the latter are symmetric across countries, while asymmetric endowments of such weapons have clear-cut destabilising consequences. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 27, No.4; Aug 2016: p.535-548 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 27 No 4 |
| Key Words | Balance of power ; Deterrence ; Defensive Shields ; War Games |