| ID | 145480 |
| Title Proper | North Korea, nuclear weapons, and the stability-instability paradox |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Roehrig, Terence |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | As the chances wane of North Korea relinquishing its nuclear weapons, how will this capability affect its behavior and tolerance of risk? Increasingly, scholars are using the Cold War concept of a stability-instability paradox to describe the possibility of Pyongyang being more willing to tolerate risk and conduct increased numbers of lower-level provocations under the cover of nuclear weapons. North Korea has long been tolerant of accepting a great deal of risk prior to its acquisition of nuclear weapons, and it is not clear if nuclear weapons have increased that tolerance––or as some have argued, it may actually decrease North Korea’s risk tolerance, making it more cautious. While North Korea’s rhetorical barrages in recent years have exceeded past outbursts, and weapons testing has done a great deal to rattle nerves, much of this can be viewed as part of its deterrence-posturing and less of the more aggressive, status quo-altering actions predicted by the stability-instability paradox. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 28, No.2; Jun 2016: p.181-198 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 28 No 2 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; Deterrence ; Nuclear Proliferation ; North Korea ; South Korea ; ROK-U.S. Alliance ; Stability-Instability Paradox ; Risk Tolerance |