| ID | 145828 |
| Title Proper | Term limits and authoritarian power sharing |
| Other Title Information | theory and evidence from China |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ma, Xiao |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Term limits that effectively govern leadership transition play an important role in authoritarian power sharing. A fixed term and a pre-appointed successor – two crucial components of term limits – credibly commit the incumbent ruler to share power with other elites, and also allow the elites to monitor and coordinate against the ruler's transgression of the power-sharing agreement. While the successful adoption of term limits often requires an even balance of power among the ruling elites in the first place, once adopted it initiates an evolving bargain over allocation of political power among multiple generations of leaders that further keeps any one faction from dominating the others. I corroborate this argument using a biographical dataset of elite members of the Chinese Communist Party from 1982 to 2012. The findings suggest that the Party's incumbent leaders and their rivals (i.e., predecessor and heir-apparent) shared equal chances in promoting their associates—which proxy their political influence—and this pattern has become more salient since the 16th party congress, when the term limits that currently govern China's leadership transition became fully fledged. This result also sheds light on the role of informal, patronage-based promotion in the institutionalization of authoritarian politics. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol. 16, No.1; Mar 2016: p. 61-85 |
| Journal Source | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol: 16 No 1 |
| Key Words | China ; Power Sharing ; Dictatorships ; Central Committee ; Term Limits ; Patronage-Based Promotion |