| ID | 146148 |
| Title Proper | Military strategy, private information, and war |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lindsey, David |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In conventional crisis bargaining models, bluffing provides the primary rationale for states to misrepresent their private information, and war occurs because strong states are unable to credibly demonstrate strength to their opponents. Here, I argue that military strategy supplies an alternative reason for states to misrepresent their private information. Both strong and weak states may misrepresent themselves because of the battlefield benefits of fighting against an uninformed opponent, who may choose a suboptimal military strategy. Under appropriate conditions, the military gains for concealing information exceed the diplomatic gains available for revealing that information. Thus, states will choose to keep secrets and fight. To demonstrate this, I incorporate military strategy into the standard bargaining framework, showing that military concerns incentivize both strong and weak states to conceal information, even when they are able to reveal that information costlessly and credibly. As in the usual model, war may occur when states underestimate their adversaries, but it may also occur when states overestimate their adversaries. I further show that a mere willingness to fight does not reveal that a state is strong. I conclude the paper with two brief case studies. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 59, No.4; Dec 2015: p.629–640 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 59 No 4 |
| Key Words | War ; Military Strategy ; Private Information |