| ID | 146159 |
| Title Proper | Capital preferences |
| Other Title Information | international capital and government partisanship |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Tomashevskiy, Andrey |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Many argue that government partisanship influences the size of investment flows into stocks and bonds. But existing literature tells us little about how international capital flows influence election outcomes. I argue that passive investment into stocks, bonds, and other debt instruments—in other words, portfolio investments—increases political contributions to right-wing parties. This investment generates resources for domestic capitalists. These owners of capital then channel these resources into political contributions to right-wing parties and enhance those parties' electoral position. Thus, passive investment bolsters the electoral chances of right-wing governments. I illustrate this process with a formal model of special interest politics in which lobbies operate under budget constraint. Using a new data set on political contributions and statistical analyses for a sample of states from 1980–2009, I find support for my general argument. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 59, No.4; Dec 2015: p.776–789 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 59 No 4 |
| Key Words | International Capital ; Government Partisanship ; Capital Preferences |