| ID | 146164 |
| Title Proper | Retirement planning for dictators |
| Other Title Information | what happens to outgoing dictators? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Tanaka, Seiki |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What happens to autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections? Autocrats gain a key benefit by holding competitive elections: a better post-tenure fate. According to my argument, autocrats who introduce competitive elections receive implicit or explicit assurances that they will be able to leave office and retire peacefully. By contrast, failing to hold a competitive election is more likely to result in a violent removal such as execution, prosecution and/or foreign intervention. The paper tests the argument by analyzing a cross-national data set of autocrats’ fates between 1960 and 2004, and the results provide evidence that autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections are more likely to lose power peacefully, and the result holds regardless of regime types. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 16, No.1; Jan 2016: p.1-25 |
| Journal Source | International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol: 16 No 1 |
| Key Words | Dictators ; Retirement Planning ; Outgoing Dictators ; Autocratic Leaders |