| ID | 146184 |
| Title Proper | Living by the sword and dying by the sword? leadership transitions in and out of dictatorships |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Debs, Alexandre |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What makes certain dictatorships more likely than others to democratize? I argue that military dictators, as specialists in violence, often remain threats to their successors. However, when democratic systems replace military dictatorships, that expertise presents less danger to new incumbents. Because democracies select leaders through elections, they reduce the importance of military expertise—and the role of associated violence—in contests for office. Thus, military dictatorships should prove more likely to transition quickly to democracy; military dictators will expect a lower likelihood of punishment—including death—at the hands of their successors than if they are replaced by other dictators. Therefore, incumbent military dictators see democratic systems as less dangerous to them; they face specific incentives to ensure a quick and effective transition to democracy. I provide support for my theory with evidence from the post-World War II period. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 60, No.1; Mar 2016: p.73-84 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 60 No 1 |
| Key Words | Military Dictators ; Leadership Transition ; Dictatorships |