| ID | 146505 |
| Title Proper | Collective action and the common enemy effect |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Jaegher, Kris De ; Hoyer, Britta |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum). |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 27, No.5; Oct 2016: p.644-664 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 27 No 5 |
| Key Words | Common Enemy Effect ; Defence Games |