| ID | 146507 |
| Title Proper | Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under’t |
| Other Title Information | mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hendel, Ulrich |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signalling game. Combining the signalling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking the behaviour of a smaller organization. Depending on its beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat, it can be optimal for a government to spend more on second-period counter-terrorism measures if it is not attacked in the first period than if it were attacked. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 27, No.5; Oct 2016: p. 665-687 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 27 No 5 |
| Key Words | Terrorism ; Game Theory ; Counter-Terrorism ; Signalling Game |