| ID | 146629 |
| Title Proper | Extended deterrence and national ambitions |
| Other Title Information | Italy’s nuclear policy, 1955–1962 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Nuti, Leopoldo |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Throughout the Cold War, Italy was one of the most steadfast NATO allies in hosting American nuclear weapons on its territory. Such a policy could easily be construed as an example of almost automatic confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, yet only on the surface did extended deterrence appease Italian anxieties about the uncertainties of the American nuclear guarantee. The Italian rationale for accepting a large array of US nuclear weapons did as a matter of fact involve a complex mix of reasons, ranging from trying to ensure that the Italian government would be consulted in the event of a major crisis, to willingness to enhance the country’s profile inside any Western multilateral fora. The paper will investigate this policy by looking at how the Italian government behaved at the height of the NATO nuclear sharing debate, between 1957 and 1962, arguably one of the historical moments in the Cold War when the concept of extended deterrence was most intensely discussed. Drawing up on hitherto classified archival sources as well as on some less-known public ones, the paper will show how Italian diplomats, military leaders and policymakers understood the dangers and political implications of US nuclear policies. It will, hopefully, demonstrate that Italy’s persistent search for a multilateral solution to the nuclearisation of NATO strategy shows that Italy never saw extended deterrence as a solution per se, but only as a temporary means to an end. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 39, No.4; Jun 2016: p.559-579 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 39 No 4 |
| Key Words | NATO ; Nuclear Weapons ; United States ; Europe ; Italy ; Extended Deterrence ; IRBMs |