| ID | 147235 |
| Title Proper | African dam building as extraversion |
| Other Title Information | the case of Sudan's dam programme, Nubian resistance, and the Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Verhoeven, Harry |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | ON 3 NOVEMBER 2015, UNDER THE WATCHFUL EYES of Saudi King Salman and Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, their respective finance ministers, Ibrahim Al-Assaf and Badredin Mahmoud, signed four agreements that committed the kingdom to funding three big dam projects in Sudan, as well as the cultivation and irrigation of more than a million acres near already-constructed dams on Sudanese territory.1 These framework accords were expanded upon when, in February 2016, Al-Assaf travelled to Khartoum to meet Mutaz Musa, Minister of Water Resources and Electricity and head of Sudan's hugely powerful Dam Implementation Unit. Ignoring the howls of anti-dam protesters assaulted by security forces, Al-Assaf committed US$5 billion in dam project finance to Sudan, which has struggled to revive economic growth following the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the loss of three-quarters of its oil production. The multi-billion dollar promises are a quid pro quo for the participation of the Sudanese Armed Forces since March 2015 in the devastating war waged in Yemen against Houthi insurgents by King Salman and his 30-year-old Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammad. |
| `In' analytical Note | African Affairs Vol. 115, No.460; Jul 2016: p.562-573 |
| Journal Source | African Affairs Vol: 115 No 460 |
| Key Words | Yemen ; African Dam Building ; Sudan's Dam Programme ; Nubian Resistance ; Saudi-Iranian Proxy War |